Vasco de Gama

Fuel burned

7,913 t

Technical

EEXI (13.63 gCO₂/t·nm)

Verified reported figure. Band is peer-relative, not official IMO CII.

• RISK OF STRIKING (near allision) - Risk of allision with a fixed object (striking - includes vessels)Moderate
  Jul 13, 2006JOHNSTONE STRAIT, BC, BRITISH COLUMBIA (BC)

  On 13 July 2006, the tug "SEASPAN REGENT,"while towing a loaded log barge "SEASPAN SURVIVOR", experienced a close quarter situation and possible risk of collision with cruise ship "STATENDAM" near Johnstone Strait, BC.

• FIRESerious
  Aug 4, 2002WHITE ISLETS, BC, BRITISH COLUMBIA (BC)

  On 04 August 2002, the passenger vessel Statendam embarked passengers in Vancouver, British Columbia, for a one-week cruise to Alaska and back. At 2025 Pacific daylight time, about three and a half hours after departure, the main circuit breaker for one of the diesel generators suffered a catastrophic failure. This started fires in the main switchboard room and the adjacent engine control room. The crew successfully extinguished both fires using portable CO2 extinguishers, and the vessel returned to Vancouver under tow. There were no injuries.

• RISK OF STRIKING (near allision) - Risk of allision with a fixed object (striking - includes vessels)Minor
  Aug 11, 1996DISCOVERY PASSAGE, B.C.

  On the evening of 11 August 1996, the cruise ship "STATENDAM", on passage from Sitka, Alaska, to Vancouver, British Columbia, made a wide turn around Chatham Point and passed close ahead of the northbound tug/barge unit "BELLEISLE SOUND"/"RADIUM 622" which was laden mostly with dangerous cargo. The cruise ship incurred minor damage to fittings in public areas when the vessel heeled over to port during a subsequent emergency manoeuvre. A number of passengers and crew sustained minor injuries. The tug/barge unit was undamaged. The Board determined that the near-collision between the "STATENDAM" and the "BELLEISLE SOUND"/"RADIUM 622" occurred because the slow rate of turn of the "STATENDAM" placed the vessel on the east side of Discovery Passage in the path of the oncoming tug/barge unit. Contributing to the incident were: the reduced visibility in fog and darkness; the pilot's lack of familiarity with the navigational systems of the "STATENDAM"; and the non-application of bridge resource management principles, especially with regard to the logical division of the workload according to the area of expertise of each member of the bridge team.

Recorded marine occurrences naming this vessel.